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On the one hand, democracy has become a widely accepted norm in our world
today. More governments than ever before are eager to define themselves as
democratic. On the other hand, the prevalent forms of democratic governance
leave many important decision-making sites outside the reach of popularly
elected bodies. Public and private economic institutions offer various examples
of significant sites of power not governed by democratic rules. Many of these
institutions transgress the boundaries of individual nation-states.1
The concentration of power in transnational and global institutions was one of
the most significant social processes of the twentieth century. Nevertheless,
democratic theory and practice have remained very nation-state centred.
Although there were some examples of cosmopolitan democratic thinking and
transnational democratic practice throughout the century, most analysts and
politicians simply ignored them. An example of a reasonably moderate attempt to
democratise global power relations, especially as regards the North–South
dimension, was the 1970s project of the New International Economic Order
(NIEO). It did not, however, lead to any significant redistribution of power and
was considered a failure by most commentators of the 1980s and 1990s.
At the very end of the century the public perception of the issues at stake
seemed to be changing. While, for example, designating the undemocratic nature
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of the International Monetary Fund as a significant political problem was
generally not taken seriously in the early 1990s, in the past two years we have
seen substantial crowds of people marching on the streets pointing out this
problem. Global capitalism may have entered one of its most serious legitimacy
crises.
While the solidarity movements related to many of the earlier attempts to
democratise global power, such as the NIEO project, tended to see the problem
more in terms of inter-state relations, many of the early twenty-first century
movements are perceiving the world in a less state-centric manner. Instead of
asking that a particular Third World state be given more decision-making power
in global affairs, today’s activists may ask for more power for the civil society
groups that confront both governmental and corporate power all over the world.
This trend has many promising aspects. In order to imagine and construct institu-
tional features of alternative futures, however, we may need political structures
that ‘civil society’, as it is generally conceived, is unlikely to deliver.
The ‘Battle in Seattle’ during the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in
1999 boosted the local, transnational and global organisations and movements
protesting against undemocratic sites of global power.2 In recent years we have
observed the emergence of an increasing number of arenas that attract civil
society organisations and active citizens to express concern about capitalist
globalisation. The arenas are varied, in terms of both political orientation and
organisational design. The spectacular demonstrations from Okinawa to Gothen-
burg and Genoa have received ample media coverage and become prominent
models of critical civil society organising. In most of them the main focus has
been on defensive measures, being against something. While reactive protests
may play an important role in democratic transformations, the concrete initiatives
for the transformations are more likely to emerge from proactive meetings.
Many of the most visible civil society gatherings have been explicitly, and
often antagonisticall y, related to events of the global elite. The principal meetings
of the intergovernmental economic institutions such as the World Bank, IMF
and WTO, including its predecessor GATT, have been facing counter-events quite
regularly since the late 1980s, including the anti-Bretton Woods riots of Berlin in
1988 and the protests against the GATT meeting of 1990 in Brussels. The lack of
democracy in these institutions has been an increasingly important motivation of
the counter-events.
More significantly but with less media attention, organised protests around
these issues have been taking place in the more peripheral parts of our world.
Some Third World observers, such as Camilo Guevara, characterise Seattle and
other similar media events in the USA and Europe as somewhat irrelevant to the
great majorities of the world.3 While I cannot fully agree with his observation, it
is undoubtedly true that in the poorer regions of the world there has been a lot
going on before and besides Seattle. Middle-class youth protesting in a European
or North American city have been much more attractive to the global media
networks than impoverished peasants campaigning against structural adjustment
programmes in the South.
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From anti-Davos to Porto Alegre
The meetings of the formally private elite organisations such as the Bilderberg
Society, Trilateral Commission and Mont Pellerin Society have also tended to
attract less public attention than those of the Bretton Woods institutions and other
semi-public multilateral organs. Nevertheless, they constitute a highly influential
network of transnational co-ordination in matters of global governance. One of
the most influential and controversial of them is the World Economic Forum
(WEF). The first informal business gathering in Davos, a Swiss mountain town,
took place in January 1971 under the name of the European Management Forum.
Since 1982 the Davos meeting has focused on bringing world economic leaders
to its annual meetings, and in 1987 it got its present name, the World Economic
Forum.4
In January 1999, after several years of preparation, various organisations
started preparing a counter-event in Switzerland under the banners of ‘another
Davos’ and ‘anti-Davos’. Apart from the World Forum of Alternatives, the
groups included the French journal Le Monde Diplomatique and Association for
the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), founded in
France in June 1998.5 In the first anti-Davos event, organised simultaneously
with the WEF 2000, various groups ranging from the World Women’s March to
the Brazilian Landless Rural Workers first had a seminar in Zurich and then
marched to Davos to hold a press conference and, for some 150 of them, to face
cold weather and Robocop-like police in a demonstration .6 The difficult geo-
graphical conditions  and heavy police presence convinced some of the key
organisers that it would be difficult to organise a huge anti-Davos gathering in
Davos itself.7
In Brazil the concrete initiative for a worldwide civil society event emerged in
early 2000. The first formulations of the idea are generally attributed to Oded
Grajew, co-ordinator of Brazilian Entrepreneur’s Association for Citizenship
(Associação Brasileira de Empresários pela Cidadania (CIVES), a progressive
entrepreneurial organisation. In February 2000 Bernard Cassen, chair of ATTAC
and director of Le Monde Diplomatique, met Grajew and Francisco Whitaker in
Paris to discuss the possibility of organising such a forum. Their discussion
produced three central ideas for the forum. First of all, it should be held in the
South, and more concretely in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre. Second, the
name should be World Social Forum (WSF), changing only one key word from the
adversary’s name. And third, it should be organised over the same dates as the
WEF, partially because this symbolism was considered attractive for the media.8
Soon after it was clear that ATTAC, Le Monde Diplomatique and other organisa-
tions influential within transnational activist networks would support the
initiative, eight Brazilian city society organisations decided to form the
Organizing Committee of the forum.9 In March 2000 they formally secured the
support of the municipal government of Porto Alegre and the state government of
Rio Grande do Sul, both controlled by the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabal-
hadores (PT)).10 Initially it was the mayor of Porto Alegre, Raul Pont, in particular
who received the idea with great enthusiasm, but soon the state government, led
by governor Olivio Dutra, also decided to dedicate plenty of time and effort to
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the WSF process.11 The idea was presented internationally by Miguel Rossetto,
vice-governor of Rio Grande do Sul, in June 2000 during an alternative UN
meeting in Geneva.
Porto Alegre, the capital of the Rio Grande do Sul state in southern Brazil, is in
many ways the most important stronghold of the PT. Founded in 1980, the party
has deep roots in trade unions, catholic organisations, women’s movements and
many other parts of the vibrant Brazilian civil society.12 Apart from its symbolic
political value Porto Alegre was a smart choice for hosting the World Social
Forum because both municipal and state governments were willing to allocate
significant material and human resources to the event. The possibili ties of
autonomous state and municipal policies had been enhanced by the 1988 Federal
Constitution, which increased resource transfer to and taxation powers of the
local authorities.13 In 2002 the municipality provided approximately US$300 000
and the state $1 million for the event.
Even though some, including Brazil’s federal president Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, have criticised the local authorities for mis-spending taxpayers’
resources, according to most estimates the thousands of visitors filling local
hotels, restaurants and other commercial establishments bring in much more
money than what is spent by local authorities. Whereas in short-term commercial
terms the WSF is considered a good deal by most locals, in ideological terms not
everyone agrees. Various business organisations and right-wing groups of Rio
Grande do Sul organise a Forum of Liberties, held two months after the WSF, with
positions openly critical of the latter.14
The first World Social Forum in January 2001 attracted some 5000 registered
participants from 117 countries and thousands of Brazilian activists. For the
second forum, the figures had grown significantly, rising to over 12 000 official
delegates from 123 countries and tens of thousands of participants in total,
mostly from Brazil.15 The global media impact of the second Forum was also
significantly stronger than in the previous year. Even though the event was
organised simultaneously with the World Economic Forum in both years, as it is
supposed to be in the near future as well, there were fewer attempts in the second
year to interact with the WEF. This reflected a growing self-confidence among the
organisers, some of whom liked to reiterate that ‘from now onwards Davos will
be the shadow event of Porto Alegre’.
The World Social Forum: arena or actor?
As regards global democratisation,  the World Social Forum can be looked at
from two angles. On the one hand, it can be analysed as an example of an
emerging institution that may embody seeds of global democracy. For example,
George Monbiot has suggested that it could form part of the process of building a
‘world parliament in exile’.16 From this perspective, it is particularly important
to look at its organisational design and the way its decision-making structure
functions. From another angle, it provides a space for actors who may construct
democratic projects in different contexts, both local and global. Among its
organisers and participants there have been different ways to emphasise these
different identities of the WSF that are by no means incompatible.
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Whereas the press has tended to look at the WSF as a (potential) political actor
in itself, many of the organisers have wanted to downplay this role and argue that
they simply provide a space for different groups to interact. These different
conceptions of the event have clashed, for example when the press has asked for
‘final declarations’ and considered the lack of any such final document a proof of
weakness in the organisation. From the perspective of most organisers the idea
has been not to produce any official final document of the event that would
pretend to represent the views of the thousands of other organisations that have
participated in the meetings.17 The unwillingness to formulate political state-
ments, beyond the Charter of Principles drafted in 2001, is occasionally
questioned among some organisers and related actors who would like to see the
WSF as an organisation expressing opinions on certain issues, such as the crises in
Argentina, Palestine and Venezuela.18
The formal decision-making power of the process has been mainly in the hands
of the Organising Committee, consisting since its foundation of the Central Trade
Union Confederation (Central Única dos Trabalhadores) (CUT), the Movement of
Landless Rural Workers (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) (MST)
and six smaller Brazilian civil society organisations. In terms of affiliates and
resources, there is a huge difference between the two big ones and the others. In
the decision-making process within the Organizing Committee, the CUT and MST
have generally acted ‘generously’ towards the smaller organisations. The
disparity of resources has generally not translated into significant disparities in
the decision-making power.
Even if the Brazilian media often portrays the events as directly organised by
the PT, the party does not formally belong to the Organizing Committee. Its
importance stems from the fact that many of the key civil society organisations
involved in the process are somehow related to or sympathetic towards it, and
that it controls the hosting city and state governments.
The other main organ of the WSF, the International Council, was founded in São
Paulo in June 2001. It consists of various organisations from different parts of the
world. The division of labour between the International Council and the
Organizing Committee has been somewhat ambiguous.19 During the first WSF the
former did not exist. When founded, the International Council was assigned an
essentially advisory role,20 but since the meetings held in Dakar in October 2001,
Porto Alegre in January 2002 and Barcelona in April 2002 its responsibilitie s
have increased. A part of the ambiguity is a result of the principle that, according
to the Organizing Committee, the International Council is not supposed to have
mechanism for disputing representation, nor for voting.21 The only time there has
been a vote was when, at its first meeting, it had to be decided whether the
following meeting would take place somewhere in Europe or in Dakar. The over-
whelming majority voted for Dakar.
A more common mechanism for making decisions in the meetings of the
International Council is that the Organizing Committee, always present in the
meetings, submits a proposal on an issue. Then the International Council debates
the issue, the debate being presided over by the Organization Committee. In case
no clear consensus emerges, the Organizing Committee will have a private
meeting and reconsider its original proposal. In some cases it will then (typically
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on the second day of the two-day meeting) present a new proposal where the
earlier discussion will have been taken into account. Normally, the new proposal
will carry the day and most everyone agrees, more or less.
The underlying assumption in this working method is that the World Social
Forum is not a deliberative body or actor that would take political stands and
thereby need rigorous decision-making procedures. Until now the system has
worked relatively well, making decisions through what some of the Brazilian
organisers call construção, constructing them in a critical debate and sometimes
laborious consensus building. The composition of the International Council and
its working methods are likely to experience changes in the future. The selection
of the founding members of the International Council, through a mixture of
invitations by the Organizing Committee and partial self-selection, was reason-
ably easy when the overall process was still known to only relatively few
networks. In the future, when there will be more groups interested in joining
the International Council, more explicit selection procedures will have to be
established.
At the moment, it seems that the International Council will have an increas-
ingly important role and, correspondingly, its name may be changed to ‘Inter-
national Committee’. According to the same plan, drafted by the Organizing
Committee in April 2002, the Organizing Committee would be called the
‘Secretariat’. Since there are plans to organise the WSF 2004 in India and later
possibly in other parts of the world, the Organizing Committee is thereby
preparing the ground for the moment when new organising committees will have
to take over many of the responsibilities held until now by the Brazilians.
Politics of Social Forum
Apart from the strictly organisational matters, the internal politics of the WSF
have been played out in the way different groups have created or been given
space during the event. Gender and especially racial tensions created some
internal controversies, particularly in the first forum.22 Even though during the
Carnival and Soccer World Cup Brazil may show an image of racial harmony,
racism is present in most walks of life, and it would be naïve to claim that it does
not exist within progressive intellectuals’ ranks. For many observers, both forums
have been surprisingly ‘white’ events.23 The perceived whiteness is not only a
result of the lack of large delegations from Africa, Asia and other parts of Latin
America, but also because the average Brazilian participating in the forum is
clearly ‘whiter’ than the average Brazilian.24
The presence of representatives of the Cuban government and of the Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) also raised mixed feelings in 2001.
Open disapproval of Cuba’s presence came mostly from outside the meeting,
particularly from the local press. In Rio Grande do Sul, the opposition has
occasionally claimed that the PT state government wants to transform the state
into ‘another Cuba’. The 2002 WSF took place in an electoral year in Brazil, and
for the electoral strategy of the PT it was important to create an image that would
not dissuade potential moderate voters. It was therefore not surprising that the
Cuban representatives no longer had a prominent official role, even though
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Cuba’s delegation was more numerous than the year before. The island’s political
visibility was perhaps clearest in the surroundings of the venue, where one could
observe plenty of Che Guevara paraphernalia displayed by many participating
organisations.
During the first WSF, the FARC guerrillas received much sympathy from some
participants. In Brazil, relatively strong anti-US sentiments are often reflected in
solidarity attitudes towards Colombian rebels, and there were even extra-official
recruitment efforts to create internationalist brigades to travel to Colombia. Not
all the participants, however, were happy with the presence of a group accused of
committing atrocities. The FARC representatives were not allowed to register as
participants in the second World Social Forum in 2002. The WSF Charter of
Principles, drafted between the first two forums and approved by the Inter-
national Council in June 2001, excludes participation by armed organisations .
The mistakenly approved registration of members of the Basque armed organisa-
tions was cancelled as soon as their identity was discovered.
Even if it is not clear whether the WSF will become a more active political
entity with more explicit internal will-formation mechanisms, it is obvious that
until now the most important impact of the forum on democratic projects has
consisted of the myriad encounters between different groups and activists within
its confines. Geographically, most participants have come from the Southern
Cone of Latin America (especially Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina) and Southern
Europe (especially Italy, France and Spain),  but there has been a conscious effort
to facilitate the participation of people from Asia, Africa and other parts of Latin
America. Even though in numbers the Asian participation has been modest, the
process has attracted increasing attention, especially in India, where the WSF 2004
will possibly take place after one more round in Porto Alegre in 2003.
In sum, the World Social Forum is one of the most promising civil society
processes that may both contribute significantly to global democracy initiatives
and constitute possibly such an initiative in itself. The enthusiasm it has
generated around the world will also bring it various dilemmas. Conceived as a
civil society initiative, the WSF will probably have international organisations ,
governments and even business organisations proposing different forms of co-
operation with it. Some organisers may emphasise the importance of clinging to
strictly defined civil society partners, others are likely to have more pragmatic
positions on obtaining material and political support. The planned organisation of
the WSF 2004 in India will be a crucial moment. On the one hand it will provide a
concrete possibility to give the process a better geographical balance. On
the other hand, it may be difficult to find hosting local governments willing to
dedicate as much energy to the process as the municipality of Porto Alegre and
the state of Rio Grande do Sul.
From Anti to Alternative
Being anti-something can be politically useful, but only up to a point. The
protesters of Seattle and similar events have been effective in pointing out
authoritarian aspects of the capitalist world-system. Even if various groups that
have participated in these events do have programmatic statements for alternative
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futures, the way these events have been staged has not been conducive to
showing these futures to the world. The criticism of not being able to show a
credible alternative, or any alternative at all, has become a problem for the
legitimacy of the protest movements.
In most of the post-Seattle events, the protesters have often been labelled ‘anti-
globalisation ’, and some of them have used the expression themselves.25 It would,
however, be analytically faulty and politically unwise simply to define the move-
ments as being against globalisation, if the term is understood as the increasing
transgression of nation-state borders on a worldwide level. Many of them are, I
would claim, looking for a different kind of globalisation, although some may
prefer to use the older term ‘internationalism’. From a democratic perspective,
the problem in some anti-globalisation rhetoric is that one easily ends up with
rather strange bedfellows. Professing anti-globalisation pure and simple is not
very helpful in terms of making a distinction between regulating the cross-border
movements of speculative capital and those of black immigrants.
Outra globalização (another globalisation) is an expression that has been
emphasised by some of the key organisers of the Porto Alegre meetings.26 Despite
their insistence, the mass media in many parts of Latin America often talk of
anti-globalisation activists when referring to both Porto Alegre and some of the
events inspired by it. The February 2001 protests related to a World Economic
Forum regional meeting in Mexico and the March 2001 marches around the
Inter-American Development Bank meeting in Santiago de Chile were the first
big globalisation-related protest events in Latin America after the first World
Social Forum, and the media coverage of them often referred to the Porto Alegre
event as an important moment in the anti-globalisation struggles.27
For those who want to argue for the possibility of a different kind of globalisa-
tion, the risk of ending up with strange bedfellows is by no means absent. It is not
always easy to see the difference, if any, of the ‘alternative’ globalisation
proposals from the idea of many business leaders that some democratisation is
necessary in order to make the global expansion of capitalism acceptable.28 Those
who cling to anti-globalisation discourse are often right when they claim that the
alternative globalisation strategies would lead to only moderate changes. Often,
but not always.
It is frequently assumed that in the anti/alternative divide of globalisation
debates, being ‘anti’ represents more radical and revolutionary options, whereas
the ‘alternatives’ are on the side of more superficial reforms. In terms of thinking
about how to democratise the world, this assumption is not helpful. Within the
alternative globalisation spectre, it is not difficult to find and even easier to
imagine such political projects that strive for a globalisation which radically
transforms the world. While anti-globalisation people can be pro-capitalist, pro-
globalisation people may be anti-capitalist .
Some of the debate and divide between the ‘anti’ and the ‘alternative’ results
from confused semantics or distorted categorisations. In order to democratise
fundamentally the world, people who have chosen to regard globalisation as a
term that has been too polluted by its dominant usage and those who think it can
still be given more progressive meanings can often work together. In principle,
the World Social Forum offers many opportunities for this to happen.
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Despite various references to the necessity of imagining and constructing a
different world, the issue of a democratic global order has not had a high priority
on the agenda of the World Social Forum. There have been claims by intel-
lectuals and groups working on issues of global democracy that the WSF process
has been too dominated by nationalists whose discourse abounds with anti-
globalisation themes. As noted by Michael Hardt, those who ‘advocate strength-
ening national sovereignty as a solution to the ills of contemporary globalisation’
have dominated the representations of the Forum. More polemically, he also
claims that while the ‘non-sovereign, alternative globalization position’ has not
obtained a prominent place in the Forum, it may well have been the position
of the majority of the participants.29 Be that as it may, one of the intellectual
problems of the World Social Forum has been the lack of open debate between
different visions of how the world should be concretely reorganised if, as the
main slogan of the WSF says, another world is to be possible .30
Learning from Porto Alegre
Already before the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre was known for its system
of participatory budget planning that many regarded as one of the most concrete
real-world examples of participatory democracy. The municipality of Porto
Alegre explicitly offers the participatory budget model, Orçamento Participativo,
as a ‘role model for the whole world’.31 Since 1989, when the Popular Front
administration led by the PT came into power, citizen participation has been an
important aspect of budget making in the city. Over 15 000 citizens participate
every year to discuss the city expenditure budget, most of them from poor
neighbourhoods. 32
The participatory budget project has been a practical school of democracy and,
according to some observers, has implied the emergence of a new ethical–
political principle.33 In terms of democratic representation, the project has not
been without its contradictions. If one considers the legislature to be an important
organ of democratic institution ality, it may seem problematic that the local
legislature tends to have its powers diminished by the participatory budget
planning. 34 Also, it has to be remembered that the participatory planning covers
only a small part of the budget and people’s participation is limited to making
relatively simple choices to pick priorities. In any case it is fair to say that it is
one of the most impressive real-world experiments with participatory democracy
on a municipal level. Porto Alegre has become one of the most cited real-world
models of participatory democracy.35 Even the World Bank has praised the model
of Porto Alegre, asserting it has ‘stood out for demonstrating an efficient practice
of democratic resource management’.36
Learning from the Porto Alegre participatory democracy can be helpful for
cosmopolitan democratic progress in two ways. One is symbolised by the banner
some local activists were carrying in the opening ceremony of the first World
Social Forum. The banner asked for global participatory budget planning, and at
least in my mind it meant democratising global economic institutions. It referred
to the potentially global use of a local initiative, where elected government has
initiated a remarkable process of popular participation.
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Learning from Porto Alegre can, at the same time, help break the Eurocentric
and neocolonial structures of knowledge production that are dominant in our
world. In traditional and even most branches of critical development thinking,
areas like Europe are considered more developed than areas like South America.
In other words, European countries can show countries like Brazil glimpses of
possible futures. ‘Developed’ countries are therefore more adult, whereas
countries like Brazil are still developing, more child-like. If we think of the world
as a school, the former are the teachers and the latter are the students.
There have been many different kinds of criticism of this idea, some of them
based on cultural relativism. Less often has it been noted that ‘developing’
countries like Brazil can show the ‘developed’ countries glimpses of their
possible futures. We can look at the informal sector and expressions of ‘multi-
culturalism’ and note that these phenomena, seen as relatively recent in, eg
Finland, have been present in Brazil for a long time. To the extent that these
processes develop in Finland, we can talk of the ‘Brazilianisation’ of Finland.
The role of credit-rating financial institutions, visibly present in Finnish
economic-policy making since the early 1990s, is another social phenomenon
that has been taking place in Brazil earlier than in Finland.
If we take seriously the fact that ‘developed’ countries in the North should not
be considered teachers of the ‘still developing’ countries in the South, we should
start a process of learning together. The Porto Alegre participatory budget policy
is an example of democratic mechanisms that European governments, local and
national and perhaps also regional, can learn from.37 Without denying the useful-
ness of some forms of traditional development co-operation, a more democratic
co-operation would be based on the idea that both partners can learn from each
other. Experts from Porto Alegre could, for example, visit Finnish municipalities
and share the know-how they have on participatory budgets.
I suggest that thinking of Brazil as offering possible futures for Europe can
have transformative implications for the cultural legitimacy of global power
relations. I would claim that, in order to analyse and struggle against the cultural
and material inequalities between the North and the South, we need to decon-
struct the developing–developed dichotomy. We need to take seriously the idea
that countries like Brazil can teach important lessons about the future of countries
like Finland. Once we achieve this change in attitudes, we have better possi-
bilities to advance global democratic transformations.
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